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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
P l a i n t i f f /Respondent, : Case No. 20557 
v . t 
PAUL ANTHONY BRANCH, : Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The fol lowing i s s u e s are present in t h i s appeal: 
1 . Did the t r i a l court properly refuse to suppress i n -
court i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s of defendant made by the S t a t e ' s wi tnesses? 
2 . Did the t r i a l court abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n in 
refusing t o give defendant's requested jury ins truct ion on 
eyewitness i d e n t i f i c a t i o n testimony? 
3 . Was the t r i a l c o u r t ' s ins truc t ion regarding 
unexplained possess ion of recent ly s to len property an acceptable 
in s t ruc t ion under the law? 
4 . Was defendant improperly convicted of both the 
greater of fense and a l e s s e r included offense? 
5 . Was the evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o support the verd ic t? 
6. Did the t r i a l court properly deny defendant's 
motion t o dismiss the habitual criminal charge? 
7. Is defendant e n t i t l e d t o reversa l s of h i s 
conv ic t ions based upon a theory of cumulative error? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Paul Anthony Branch, was charged with 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. S 
76-6-302 (1978) , aggravated assault, a third degree felony, under 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-103 (1978), theft, a second degree felony, 
under Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978), and of being a habitual 
criminal under Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1978) (R. 122-16). 
After a jury trial, he was found guilty as charged (R. 236-38, 
263). The trial court sentenced defendant to terms in the Utah 
State Prison of five years to life for aggravated robbery, zero 
to five years for aggravated assault, one to fifteen years for 
theft, and one to fifteen years for being a habitual criminal, 
the sentences to run concurrently (R. 276-79). The court also 
imposed a consecutive sentence of one year for use of a firearm 
(R. 280) .! 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts pertinent to the issues raised by defendant 
on appeal are the following. On August 18, 1984, at 
approximately 5:15 p.m., a man entered Oakwood Jewelers, located 
in Salt Lake County, and forced Joanne Knaphus, a saleswoman, at 
gunpoint into a bathroom in the rear of the store. The man 
threatened to shoot Ms. Knaphus if she did not stay in the 
bathroom. She observed that this man had a beard and was wearing 
1 Defendant was tried jointly with the two codefendants. One of 
those codefendants, Allen Johnson, was acquitted on all charges 
(R. 239-41). However, the other Raymond Johnson, was convicted 
and has taken an appeal to this Court. See State v. Johnson, 
Case No. 20562. 
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a baseball cap, but because the man explicitly warned her not to 
look at him, she did not get a close look at his face (R. 616-18, 
623, 643). 
Soon thereafter, a second man entered the jewelry 
store, opened the showcases, and began to remove jewelry (R. 
619) • A customer, Stella Kyarsgaard, entered the store and saw 
the second man, whom she later identified as defendant, standing 
behind one of the showcases (R. 1227-28). Defendant forced Ms. 
Kyarsgaard to the rear of the store where the first man stood 
guard with a gun (R. 1215, 1220). The first man pointed the gun 
at her and ordered her not to look at him. He then grabbed her 
by the arm and pulled her into the darkened bathroom where he had 
previously imprisoned Ms. Knaphus (R. 1221, 1229). After it 
appeared that the two men had left the store, the women exited 
the bathroom and observed that all of the jewelry in the 
showcases was missing (R. 1225). 
Outside the jewelry store in the parking lot Marsha 
Wright and her daughter, Misty, were sitting in their car. Both 
noticed two men, one taller than the other, carrying a large 
plastic garbage bag which appeared to contain numerous small 
boxes. The men, who had beards and were wearing baseball caps 
and dark clothing, walked hurriedly in front of the Wrights1 car 
to a tan or beige car occupied by a man and woman and jumped into 
the back seat. The car was then driven rapidly away from the 
shopping center (R. 1078-96, 1129-38). 
At about this same time, Daniel Williams was sitting in 
a restaurant located near Oakwood Jewelers. Through a window he 
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noticed two men, one taller than the other but both bearded and 
wearing baseball caps, walk toward Oakwood Jewelers. Ten to 
fifteen minutes later, he saw the same two men walking in the 
opposite direction (R. 1181-92). 
On August 24, 1984, police officers in Los Angeles, 
California, arrested several individuals at a motel—including 
defendant's codefendants, Allen Johnson and Raymond Johnson—for 
being under the influence of a controlled substance. Searches 
conducted pursuant to those arrests produced, among other things, 
a substantial amount of the jewelry taken from Oakwood Jewelers. 
The officers impounded Raymond Johnson1s car. See State v. 
Raymond Jeffrey Johnson, Case No. 20562, Brief of Respondent at 
4-6. 
On September 16, 1984, a police officer in Salt Lake 
City stopped a vehicle driven by defendant for traveling at an 
excessive speed. He subsequently arrested defendant on an 
outstanding aggravated robbery warrant. Defendant had only a 
small amount of money and no jewelry on his person at the time 
(R. 1295-97). 
Prior to defendant's and his codefendants1 joint trial, 
he filed a motion to suppress any in-court identifications by the < 
State's witnesses. That motion alleged that "previous 
identifications of defendant Branch by prosecution witnesses have 
been so suggestive and unreliable as to render future possible < 
identifications excludable under Rule 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, and in violation of defendant's constitutional rights 
prohibiting abuse of due process" (R. 49). After a lengthy i 
hearing on the motion, the trial court denied it (R. 473-558). 
-4-
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At trial, Ms. Kyarsgaard identified defendant as the 
person who encountered her at the front of the jewelry store and 
pushed her to the rear bathroom* She did this after first 
erroneously identifying a codefendant, Allen Johnson, as that 
person (R. 1212, 1226-28)• She was able to give only a very 
limited description of the second man with a gun at the bathroom 
(R. 1220-21)• 
Marsha Wright identified defendant and Raymond Johnson 
•4-
as the two men she saw get i n t o the car in the parking l o t 
outside the jewelry s t o r e . She a l so recognized p i c tures of 
Johnson's car, recovered in h i s possess ion in Los Angeles, as the 
car she had seen defendant and Johnson get i n t o on the day of the 
robbery (R. 1085) . Her daughter made s imilar in-court 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s (R. 1136-39) . 
Mr. Williams p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d defendant and 
Raymond Johnson as the two men he had seen near Oakwood Jewelry 
on the day of the robbery (R. 1187) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant f a i l s to demonstrate that the t r i a l court 
abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n in refusing t o suppress in-court 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s of him by State w i tnes se s . This Court w i l l not 
upset a t r i a l c o u r t ' s rul ing on a motion t o suppress unless i t 
f inds that the lower court was c l e a r l y in error. Because the 
t r i a l court could have reasonably come to the conclusions that i t 
did based upon the record before i t , i t s evidentiary rul ing 
should be susta ined. 
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The t r i a l c o u r t ' s denial of defendant's request that a 
cautionary eyewitness i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ins truc t ion be given the 
jury was c o n s i s t e n t with past precedent from t h i s Court* 
The t r i a l cour t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n t o the jury regarding 
unexplained possess ion of recent ly s t o l e n property was 
permiss ible under S ta te v. Asay, 631 P.2d 861 (Utah 1981) , and 
State v , Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985) . 
Under the f a c t s of t h i s case , defendant committed three 
l e g a l l y d i s t i n c t a c t s for which he could be convicted of 
aggravated robbery, aggravated a s s a u l t , and t h e f t . Therefore, 
the mul t ip le convic t ions were not prohibited under the holding of 
S ta te v. H i l l . 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983) . 
Defendant's i n s u f f i c i e n c y of evidence claim i s l i t t l e 
more than a request for t h i s Court t o a s s e s s independently the 
weight of the evidence and the c r e d i b i l i t y of the w i t n e s s e s . 
Because t h i s i s a function reserved s o l e l y for the jury, the 
Court should re jec t defendant's insuf f i c i ency argument. 
Because defendant f a i l e d t o rebut the presumption that 
h i s prior fe lony convic t ions were based on voluntary g u i l t y 
p l e a s , those prior convic t ions were properly admitted in to 
evidence and r e l i e d on in the determination that defendant was a 
habitual cr iminal . 
Defendant's cumulative error argument should be 
disposed of in the same way t h i s Court disposed of a s imilar 
argument in State v. Rammel t 36 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 42-43, 
P.2d , (1986). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE IS 
ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTIONS 
BASED UPON THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO 
SUPPRESS IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS OF HIM 
BY STATE WITNESSES. 
Re ly ing p r i m a r i l y on N e i l v . B i g q e r s , 409 U.S. 188 
( 1 9 7 2 ) , and Utah R. Ev id . 403 (Supp. 1 9 8 6 ) , defendant contends 
t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of h i s p r e t r i a l motion t o suppress 
i n - c o u r t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s of him by S t a t e w i t n e s s e s r e q u i r e s 
r e v e r s a l s of h i s c o n v i c t i o n s . Such a r e s u l t i s not warranted . 
Although defendant p r e s e n t s a l e n g t h y argument on t h i s 
i s s u e r he f a i l s t o demonstrate t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t could not 
have reasonably come t o t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e d c o n c l u s i o n s : 
The Court i s i n c l i n e d a t t h i s p o i n t t o deny t h e 
m o t i o n s , and i t i s i n c l i n e d t o deny t h e mot ions 
and I want t o g i v e you , Ms. Wel l s f an opportu-
n i t y t o a t l e a s t argue t o the mot ion . The court 
f e e l s t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e of any wrongdoing or 
any t a i n t i n the photo spread i t s e l f or any p r e -
t r i a l procedure by t h e p o l i c e . One of t h e pur-
p o s e s of e x c l u d i n g t e s t imony in c a s e s such a s 
t h i s , i s so t h a t — i t i s somewhat a harsh remedy 
t o keep a w i t n e s s from t e s t i f y i n g where they 
have a p o s i t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n f but something 
happens during the photo spread . We have no 
ev idence of any wrongdoing or anything t h a t i s 
i m p e r m i s s i b l e i n regard t o the spread i t s e l f and 
so f o r t h . The only t h i n g t h a t you have p r e s e n t e d 
us i s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e w i t n e s s e s may have a 
s l i g h t d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e i r t e s t imony of one type 
or a n o t h e r , and the Court b e l i e v e s t h a t g o e s t o 
c r o s s examinat ion and t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e w i t -
n e s s e s and should not go t o the e x c l u s i o n of 
t h a t t e s t imony i t s e l f . So f t h a t i s where t h e 
Court i s and I want t o g i v e you a chance t o 
argue t h a t b e f o r e I r u l e . 
(R. 539) 
The Court, in reviewing the summary, and while 
the summary is not in evidence as an exhibit, 
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i t i s a summary of the defendant, prepared by 
Ms. Wel ls , who represents one of the defendants 
and does summarize testimony and information 
given t o o f f i c e r s subject to objec t ions made by 
the S ta te counsel . That summary, the Court 
f e e l s shows a kind of a cons i s tent l i n e . Some 
of the wi tnesses referred t o the suspects as 
Pak i s tan i s , Iranian, middle eas tern , Cuban, 
Mexican, dark complexioned. They a l l seem to 
be in an agreement of that f a c t . They are a l l 
dark complexioned and i t i s , to some people , a 
cer ta in national c h a r a c t e r i s t i c means two d i f -
ferent t h i n g s . I know, in my l i f e , my—I don't 
know i f t h i s should be brought up—nty own 
daughter's very best friend i s from Mexico Ci ty , 
j u s t moved t o t h i s country a year ago. Very 
Mexican. But I would have sa id she was Austral -
ian or something t o that e f f e c t . But I think 
the fact of the matter i s , our world i s becoming 
more cosmopolitan. We sometimes have s t e r e o -
type ideas of what a Mexican i s or Chicano, or 
what a Pakistani i s , or what a Phi l ippino i s , 
and sometimes we have so much news coverage 
nowadays of the Mid East, i t i s sometimes d i f f i -
c u l t for some wi tnesses t o give a proper i d e n t i -
f i c a t i o n of n a t i o n a l i t y . But the fac t of the 
matter i s , a l l of the wi tnesses are agreed those 
suspects that they i d e n t i f i e d were dark com-
plec ted and i d e n t i f i e d as e i ther being Mexican, 
Cuban, Middle Eastern, Pakis tan i s , Iranian, dark 
complexioned. Certa in ly , those wi tnesses w i l l 
be subject to cross examination t o assure that 
t h e i r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s are correct . And that 
should happen at t r i a l . 
As for t h i s hearing, the Court f e e l s there i s no 
real evidence here of unnecessari ly sugges t ive 
procedures that took place during any p r e t r i a l 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . The c l o s e s t thing that we have 
i s the two photographs within the one spread. 
The Court doesn't f e e l , in i t s own review of 
those photographs, that t h i s was in error in 
any way or sugges t ive and i s going to so f i n d . 
The Court i s going t o therefore deny the de-
fendant 's motions in regards t o the suppression 
of wi tnesses from t e s t i f y i n g a t court . 
The Court b e l i e v e s that the t o t a l i t y of circum-
stances in reviewing a l l of these summaries and 
the spread and l i s t e n i n g t o argument of counsel , 
d i c t a t e s such a rul ing and t h i s i s the Court's 
order in t h i s regard. 
- 8 -
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(R. 556-58) • 
As noted by this Court in State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d 
753 (Utah 1985): 
A motion t o suppress requests that a t r i a l 
judge determine whether proffered evidence 
i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y defect ive* In making 
such a rul ing f a t r i a l judge w i l l often be 
ca l l ed upon pre l iminari ly t o reso lve factual 
d i spute s . S ta te v. T u t t l e , 16 Utah 2d 288, 
291, 399 P.2d 580, 582 (1965) . If , after 
reso lv ing the fac tua l quest ions in h i s own 
mind, the judge concludes that the State has 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant's cons t i tu t iona l r ights 
1
 w i l l not be v i o l a t e d by admission of the 
evidence, i t i s admitted. Cf.. Lego v . Twomey, 
404 U.S. 477, 489, 92 S.Ct. 619, 626, 30 
L.Ed.2d 618 (1972) . On appeal, we w i l l not 
d is turb the t r i a l court ' s reso lut ion of the 
factual i s sues underlying i t s dec i s ion t o 
grant or deny the motion to suppress absent 
c lear error. State v . T u t t l e , 16 Utah 2d 
at 291 , 674 P.2d at 125; State v. Cole. 
Utah, 674 P.2d 119, 122 , 1215 (1983) . 
699 P.2d at 755. I t then went on to uphold the lower court ' s 
denial of the defendant's motion t o suppress an in-court 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n which, l i k e defendant's motion, was based on Nei l 
v . Biqgers. Accordingly, the t r i a l cour t ' s rul ing on defendant's 
suppression motion should be upheld. See a l so S ta te v. Bingham, 
684 P.2d 4 3 , 45 (Utah 1984) . A s imi lar conclusion should be 
reached i f the quest ion i s analyzed under Utah R. Evid. 403. 
This i s so because defendant has not shown that the cour t ' s 
rul ing was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n so severe that i t resu l ted in a 
l i k e l i h o o d of i n j u s t i c e . State v . Rovball , 710 P.2d 168, 169 
(Utah 1985); S ta te v. Knowles, 709 P.2d 311 , 312 (Utah 1985) 
(upholding the t r i a l c o u r t ' s rul ing that evidence should not be 
excluded under Rule 403) . 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION. 
Defendant argues that the t r i a l court erred in refusing 
to g ive h i s requested i n s t r u c t i o n on eyewitness i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
(see Defendant's Requested Ins truc t ion No. 3 , R. 1 0 1 - 0 2 . . That 
i n s t r u c t i o n i s modeled after the one recommended in United S t a t e s 
v . T e l f a i r e , 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972 ) . 
Prior t o i t s recent opinion in S ta te v. Long, 36 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 1 1 , P.2d (1986) , t h i s Court had repeatedly held 
that spec ia l i n s t r u c t i o n s on eyewitness i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ("Telfaire 
i n s t r u c t i o n s ) are not mandatory; ins tead , the dec i s ion of whether 
to g ive T e l f a i r e i n s t r u c t i o n s i s d i scret ionary with the t r i a l 
court . State v . Tucker. 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985); S ta te v . 
Bingham. 684 P.2d 43 , 45 (Utah 1984); S ta te v. Watson, 684 P.2d 
39 , 40 (Utah 1984) . In response to the d e f e n d a n t s argument that 
the t r i a l court erred in refusing to g ive h i s requested 
i n s t r u c t i o n s on eyewitness i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , Jus t ice Durham, 
wr i t ing for a unanimous Court in Bingham, s t a t e d : 
Jury ins truc t ions must be considered as a 
whole. "When taken as a whole i f they f a i r l y 
tender the case to the jury, the fact that 
one or more of the i n s t r u c t i o n s , standing 
a lone , are not as f u l l or accurate as they 
might have been i s not r e v e r s i b l e error ." 
State v . Brooks, Utah 638 P.2d 537, 542 
(1981) ( c i t a t i o n omitted) . At Bingham's 
t r i a l , the jury was ins tructed that the 
S ta te had the burden to prove him g u i l t y 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jurymen 
were the e x c l u s i v e judges of the c r e d i b i l i t y 
of the w i t n e s s e s , and that the jurymen must 
f ind that Bingham had committed a l l of the 
elements of the of fenses he was charged 
with in order t o f ind him g u i l t y . Taken as 
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a whole, these i n s t r u c t i o n s adequately ad-
v i s e d the jury on the law pertaining t o t h i s 
case . State v . Schaffer , Utah 638 P.2d 1185 f 
1187 (1981) . 
685 P.2d a t 4 5 . Also, "It lhe fact that there i s s o l e eyewitness 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n does not , standing alone, mandate a cautionary 
i n s t r u c t i o n . " State v . Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah 1984) . 
Under these standards, no error was committed in the 
instant case . Ins truct ion Nos. 6 , 7 , 1 1 , 1 2 , 3 3 , 36 and 39 (R. 
175-75, 180-81 , 202-03 , 207-08, 213-14) c l ear ly informed the jury 
that the S ta te had the burden t o prove defendant g u i l t y beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the jurors were the e x c l u s i v e judges of 
the c r e d i b i l i t y of the w i t n e s s e s , and that the jurors must f ind 
that defendant had committed a l l of the elements of the offenses 
with which he was charged before they could f ind him g u i l t y . The 
circumstances of the eyewitness i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s in t h i s case , 
unlike those i d e n t i f i e d in Long,2 36 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14-15 , did 
not mandate the g iv ing of a cautionary i n s t r u c t i o n . See State v. 
Newton, 681 P.2d 833 (Utah 1984) . 
POINT I I I 
NO ERROR OCCURRED WHEN THE TRIAL COURT GAVE 
\ THE JURY AN INSTRUCTION REGARDING UNEXPLAINED 
POSSESSION OF RECENTLY STOLEN PROPERTY. 
At t r i a l , the court gave the jury the fo l lowing 
i n s t r u c t i o n regarding unexplained possess ion of recent ly s to l en 
property: 
2 The mandatory standard concerning eyewitness i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
i n s t r u c t i o n s adopted in Long, 36 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 18, was made 
prospect ive only and thus does not apply to defendant's case . 
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Under the law of the S ta te of Utah, possess ion 
of property recent ly s t o l e n , when a person in 
possess ion f a i l s t o make a s a t i s f a c t o r y explana-
t ion of such posses s ion , i s a f a c t from which 
you may infer that the person in possess ion 
s t o l e such property. 
Ins truct ion No. 19 (R. 1 8 8 ) . Defendant objected t o t h i s 
i n s t r u c t i o n on the grounds that more than construct ive possess ion 
must be shown and that i t uncons t i tu t iona l ly s h i f t e d the burden 
of proof t o the defendant (R. 1619-20) . On appeal, he argues 
that the i n s t r u c t i o n denied him a f a i r t r i a l for three reasons: 
(1) the evidence f a i l e d to e s t a b l i s h that he had been found in 
posses s ion of any recent ly s t o l e n property, (2) the i n s t r u c t i o n 
v i o l a t e d h i s r ight t o remain s i l e n t , and (3) the i n s t r u c t i o n 
impermissibly s h i f t e d the burden of proof from the S ta te t o him. 
Defendant's f i r s t complaint about the i n s t r u c t i o n 
merits but a short response. If , as defendant contends, the 
evidence f a i l e d to show that he possessed any recent ly s t o l e n 
property, then the jury obviously would have had no reason t o 
apply Ins truct ion No. 19 t o him. It cannot be reasonably argued 
that i t did so under these circumstances. Furthermore, i f 
defendant had any concerns in t h i s regard, he should have 
requested a c l a r i f y i n g i n s t r u c t i o n on the appl ica t ion of 
i 
Instruct ion No. 19. Fa i l ing to do t h i s , defendant has l i t t l e 
room to complain. 
Defendant's remaining content ions may a l so be dea l t 
with summarily. Beyond defendant's f a i l u r e to preserve the f i f t h 
amendment objec t ion t o the i n s t r u c t i o n he r a i s e s on appeal , s e e , 
Utah R. Crim. P. 1 9 ( c ) , that i s s u e , as we l l as the i s s u e 
i 
concerning unconst i tut iona l burden s h i f t i n g , were resolved 
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a g a i n s t him in S t a t e v . Asav, 631 P.2d 8 6 1 , 863-64 (Utah 1981)
 f 
and S t a t e v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 3 2 1 , 324-25 (Utah 1985) . 
Defendan t ' s argument t h a t t h e use of t h e phrase "when a person in 
pos se s s ion f a i l s t o make a s a t i s f a c t o r y e x p l a n a t i o n of such 
p o s s e s s i o n " (emphasis added) v i o l a t e d h i s r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t , 
i g n o r e s Asay' s approval of a s i m i l a r l y worded i n s t r u c t i o n . The 
i n s t r u c t i o n a t i s sue in A say read : 
You a r e f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t e d t h a t one who i s 
found t o be in posses s ion of p roper ty r e -
c e n t l y s t o l e n , may be found t o be t h e 
g u i l t y person un l e s s tie g ives a s a t i s f a c t o r y 
e x p l a n a t i o n of h i s posses s ion thereof* 
631 P.2d a t 863 (emphasis a d d e d ) . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e Asay 
d e c i s i o n was c i t e d wi th approval i n Chambers, 709 P.2d a t 326. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND THEFT. 
Defendant a rgues t h a t he was improperly convic ted of 
aggrava ted robbery , aggravated a s s a u l t , and t h e f t . Relying on 
S t a t e v . H i l l , 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983) , he concludes t h a t 
aggravated a s s a u l t and t h e f t , under t h e f a c t s of h i s c a se , were 
l e s s e r inc luded of fenses of aggrava ted robbery . Accordingly , he 
asks t h i s Court t o r eve r se t h e a s s a u l t and t h e f t c o n v i c t i o n s . 
F i r s t , under t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a se , defendant could 
p rope r ly be convic ted of both aggravated robber and aggrava ted 
a s s a u l t ; h i s r e l i a n c e on H i l l i s misp laced . As the t r i a l cour t 
c o r r e c t l y concluded in response t o both d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o 
d i smiss and d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o a r r e s t judgment (R. 5 8 3 ) , the 
robbery and a s s a u l t charges invo lved , in a l e g a l s e n s e , two 
d i s t i n c t a c t s by defendant , committed w i t h i n a s i n g l e c r i m i n a l . 
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Whether a g r e a t e r - l e s s e r offense r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s in a 
part icular case , under e i ther Hi l l or S ta te v. Baker, 671 P.2d 
152 (Utah 1983) (which s e t s forth the t e s t t o determine whether a 
defendant i s e n t i t l e d t o a requested l e s s e r included offense 
i n s t r u c t i o n ) , i s an i s sue only where a s i n g l e act of the 
defendant i s involved. For example, in a criminal homicide case 
the quest ion may be whether the defendant's s i n g l e act of k i l l i n g 
cons t i tu ted second degree murder or manslaughter (a l e s s e r 
included offense of second degree murder). If the defendant had 
committed two a c t s of k i l l i n g within a s ing l e criminal episode , 
one c o n s t i t u t i n g second degree murder and the other manslaughter, 
the defendant could not s u c c e s s f u l l y argue that , because the two 
of fenses f a l l within the g r e a t e r - l e s s e r offense r e l a t i o n s h i p , he 
could be convicted of only one o f fense . I t i s c lear tha t , i f 
"the crimes were a re su l t of separate and d i s t i n c t a c t s that 
resu l ted in separate and d i s t i n c t cr imes ," a defendant may be 
convicted and sentenced for each of the of fenses ar i s ing out of a 
s i n g l e criminal episode* S ta te v. O'Brien, 37 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 , 
4 , P.2d , (1986) . S^e a lso State v . J o l i v e t , 712 P.2d 
843, 844 (Utah 1986); S ta te v. Porter . 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 
1985) . 
In defendant's case , the evidence e s tab l i shed that 
defendant and a companion, who were armed with a gun, entered a 4 
jewelry s tore to rob i t . The s tore clerk Ms. Knaphus, was forced 
at gun po int , i n t o a bathroom at the rear of the s t o r e . While in 
the act of removing jewelry from a showcase, defendant committed 
* i 
the addi t ional and separate ac t of phys i ca l ly forc ing Ms. 
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Kyarsgaard, a customer who had subsequently entered the store, 
the rear of the store where his accomplice pointed a gun at her 
and pulled her into the bathroom where Ms. Knaphus was. Based 
upon this criminal episode, the State charged defendant with 
aggravated robbery (alleging Ms. Knaphus as the victim) and 
aggravated assault (alleging Ms. Kyarsgaard as the victim) (R. 
12-13). At trial, the court gave the jury the following 
pertinent instructions regarding those offenses: 
Instruction No. 33 
Before you can convict the defendant, Paul 
Anthony Branch, of the crime of Aggravated Rob-
bery as charged in Count I of the Information 
on file in this case, you must believe from all 
of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt 
each and every one of the following elements of 
that offense: 
1. That on or about the 18th day of 
August, 1984, within the corporate limits of 
Salt Lake County, the defendant, Paul Anthony 
Branch, either attempted or committed or fled 
from the attempt or commission of a robbery 
of Joanne Knaphus or solicited or requested 
or commanded or encouraged or intentionally 
aided another person or other persons to en-
gage in the commission of said robbery of 
Joanne Knaphus; and 
2. That said defendant then and there 
either used or solicited or requested or 
commanded or encouraged or intentionally 
aided another person or other persons to use 
a deadly weapon; and 
3. That said defendant then and there 
did so intentionally or knowingly. 
If, after careful consideration of all 
of the evidence in this case, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any 
one or more of the foregoing elements, then 
you must find the defendant, Paul Anthony 
Branch, not guilty of Count I. If, on the 
other hand, you are convinced of the truth 
of each and every one of the foregoing 
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elements beyond a reasonable doubt then you 
must find the defendant, Paul Anthony Branch, 
guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged in 
Count I of the Information on file in this 
case. 
(R. 202-03) 
Instruction No. 36 
Before you can convict the defendant, 
Paul Anthony Branch, of the crime of Aggra-
vated Assault as charged in Count II of the 
Information on file in this case, you must 
believe from all of the evidence and beyond 
a reasonable doubt, each and every one of 
the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 18th day of 
August, 1984, within the corporate limits 
of Salt Lake County, the defendant, Paul 
Anthony Branch, either assaulted Stella 
Kya [rlsgaard; or solicited or requested olrl 
commandled] or encouraged or intentionally 
aided another person or persons to assault 
Stella Kyafrlsgaard; and 
2. That said defendant then and there, 
either: 
a* used a deadly weapon; or 
Js# solicited or requested or 
commanded or encouraged 
or intentionally aided %
 another to use a deadly 
weapon; and 
3. That said defendant did so inten-
tionally or knowingly; and 
4. That said defendant then and there 
used a firearm or facsimile of a firearm or 
a representation of a firearm or solicited 
or requested or commanded or encouraged or 
intentionally aided another to use a firearm 
or a facsimile of a firearm or a representa-
tion of a firearm. 
If, after careful consideration of all of 
the evidence in this case you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of 
the foregoing elements, then you must find the 
defendant Paul Anthony Branch, not guilty of 
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Count I I . If on the other handr you are con-
vinced of the t ru th of each and every one of 
the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you must find the defendant Paul 
Anthony Branch, gu i l ty of the offense of Ag-
gravated Assault as charged on Count I I of the 
Information. 
(R. 207-08). 
Like the information f i l ed against defendant these 
ins t ruc t ions p la in ly se t out two d i s t i n c t a c t s within a single 
criminal episode. Therefore, Hill i s not appl icable to the 
s i t u a t i o n , and defendant was properly convicted of both of the 
offenses charged. 
A similar analysis appl ies t o defendant 's argument t h a t 
he could not be convicted of both aggravated robbery and t h e f t . 
In response t o defendant 's motion t o dismiss the thef t count 
under H i l l , the prosecutor argued t h a t , because second degree 
felony theft—as i t was charged in t h i s case—requires proof tha t 
the property s tolen had a value in excess of $1,000 (see Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (a) (i) (1978)), an element t h a t need not 
be proved for aggravated robbery, t h i s va r i a t ion of thef t i s not 
a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery under the holding 
of H i l l . Although i t i s not c lear from the record on what 
grounds i t ruled, the t r i a l court denied the motion t o dismiss. 
Although the prosecutor1 s theory for d is t inguishing 
t h i s case from Hil l may be va l id , i t i s not necessary to discuss 
i t , or the t r i a l c o u r t ' s poss ible re l iance on i t , in resolving 
the issue defendant p resen ts . I t i s well s e t t l e d t h a t t h i s Court 
may affirm a decision on any proper ground "even though the t r i a l 
court assigned another reason for i t s r u l i n g . " S ta te v . Bryan, 
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709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985) • Here, the t r i a l court presumably 
analyzed defendant's motion to dismiss the the f t count under the 
holding of Hi l l which r e l i e d on Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) 
(1978)• However, a Hi l l a n a l y s i s was not appropriate under the 
circumstances. As was the case with the aggravated robbery and 
aggravated as sau l t charges, the aggravated robbery and the f t 
charges involved, in a l e g a l sense , two d i s t i n c t a c t s by 
defendant, committed within a s i n g l e criminal episode—one 
cons t i tu ted aggravated robbery and the other t h e f t . 
The t r i a l court gave the jury the fo l lowing 
i n s t r u c t i o n s regarding those o f f e n s e s : 
Ins truct ion No. 20 
Each defendant has been charged by Count 
I of the Information in t h i s case with v i o l a -
t ion of a s t a t u t e which provides , in part 
pert inent t o t h i s case , as f o l l o w s : 
" . . . a person commits Aggravated 
Robbery i f in the course of committing 
robbery, he . . . uses a firearm or a 
f a c s i m i l e of a firearm . . . or a 
deadly weapon • . •" 
"• • . for the purpose of t h i s part , 
an act sha l l be deemed to be in the 
course of committing a robbery i f i t 
occurs in an attempt to commit, during 
the commission of, or the immediate 
f l i g h t after the attempt or commission 
of a robbery." 
(R. 189) 
Ins truc t ion No. 21 
A re la ted s t a t u t e provides , in part pert inent 
t o t h i s case , as f o l l o w s : 
". . . Robbery i s the unlawful and 
in tent iona l taking of personal property 
from the possess ion of another from h i s 
person, or immediate presence, against 
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h i s w i l l , accompanied by means of force 
or f e a r . " 
(R. 190) 
Instruction No. 22 
The elements of Robbery, as they relate to 
this case, are: 
1« The taking of personal property from 
another person; and 
2# The possession or immediate presence 
of such other person of said property; and 
3. The taking of such property against 
the will of such other person; and 
4* The accomplishment of such taking by 
means of force or fear; and 
5. Such taking being then and there 
unlawful; 
6. Such taking being then and there inten-
tional. 
Instruction No. 26 
Each defendant has been charged by Count III 
of the Information in this case with violation of 
a statute which provides, in part pertinent to 
this caser as follows: 
"A person commits theft if he obtains 
or exercises unlawful control over the 
property of another with the purpose to 
deprive him thereof." 
(R. 195) 
Instruct ion No. 33 
Before you can convict the defendant, Paul 
Anthony Branch, of the crime of Aggravated Rob-
bery as charged in Count I of the Information 
on f i l e in t h i s case , you must b e l i e v e from a l l 
of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt 
each and every one of the fo l lowing elements of 
that o f f ense : 
1 . That on or about the 18th day of August, 
1984, within the corporate l i m i t s of S a l t Lake 
19-
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Countyr the defendant/ Paul Anthony Branch/ either 
attempted or commited or fled from the attempt or 
commission of a robbery of Joanne Knaphus or 
solicited or requested or commanded or encouraged 
or intentionally aided another person or other 
persons to engage in the commission of said 
robbery of Joanne Knaphus; and 
2. That said defendant then and there 
either used or solicited or requested or 
commanded or encouraged or intentionally 
aided another person or other persons to 
use a deadly weapon; and 
3. That said defendant then and there 
did so intentionally or knowingly. 
If/ after careful consideration of all of 
the evidence in this casef you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of 
f the foregoing elements/ then you must find the 
defendant/ Paul Anthony Branch/ not guilty of 
Count I. If/ on the other hand/ you are con-
vinced of the truth of each and every one of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt 
then you must find the defendant/ Paul Anthony 
Branch/ guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged 
in Count I of the Information on file in this 
case. 
(R. 202-03) 
Ins truct ion No. 40 
Before you can convict the defendant/ Paul 
Anthony Branch/ of the crime of Theft as charged 
in Count I I I of the Information on f i l e in 
Y t h i s case f you must b e l i e v e from a l l of the 
N evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and 
\ every one of the fo l lowing elements of that 
o f f ense : 
1 . That on or about the 18th day of August/ 
1984/ within the corporate l i m i t s of S a l t Lake 
County/ the defendant/ Paul Anthony Branch/ e i t h e r ; 
a. Obtained or exerc i sed unauthorized 
control over property; or 
b. S o l i c i t e d or requested or commanded 
or encouraged or aided another or 
others in obtaining or e x e r c i s i n g 
unauthorized control over such 
property; and 
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2. That said defendant did so intentionally 
or knowingly; and 
3. That said property then and there belonged 
to Oakwood Jewelry; and 
4. That said defendant then and there had a 
purpose to deprive another; and 
5. That said property then and there had a 
value in excess of $1,000.00. 
Ifr after careful consideration of all of the 
evidence in this case, you are not convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the fore-
going elements, then you must find the defendant, 
Paul Anthony Branch, not guilty of Count III. If, 
on the other hand, you are convinced of the truth 
of each and every one of the foregoing elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant, Paul Anthony Branch, guilty of Theft as 
charged in Count III of the Information on file in 
this case. 
(R. 215-16). 
These instructions made clear to the jurors that, in 
order to convict defendant of aggravated robbery, they need only 
find that defendant used a deadly weapon in an attempt to commit 
a robbery; and, an attempted robbery, of course, would not 
require a finding that property had been taken. "A person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind 
of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the 
offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) 
(1978). This means that, to be guilty of an attempt, a defendant 
must possess the mental state required for commission of the 
offense. State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah 1982). And, 
on the question of what constitutes a substantial step toward 
commission of the offense, this Court has observed* 
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The [attempt] s t a t u t e adopts the d e f i n i t i o n 
of an "attempt" employed in the Model Penal Code, 
S 5 . 0 1 , purposed on drawing the l i n e further 
away from the f i n a l act and enlarging the common 
law concept. I t emphasizes what the accused has 
done, not what remains to be done. 
S ta te v . Pearson. 680 P.2d 406 , 408 (Utah 1984) ( footnote 
omit ted) . Under these standards, i t i s c lear that defendant 
committed aggravated robbery the moment he entered the jewelry 
s tore with h i s accomplice. See Pearson (holding that evidence 
was s u f f i c i e n t t o support convic t ions of attempted burglary and 
robbery where defendant was stopped and arrested while driving to 
the l o c a t i o n where he planned t o commit the o f f e n s e s ) . In short , 
defendant's a c t i o n s , prior t o the actual taking of the jewelry , 
e s t a b l i s h e d an attempt t o commit a robbery, and the use of a 
deadly weapon converted that attempt i n t o aggravated robbery. 
That the robbery was subsequently completed i s of no consequence; 
a f inding of an attempt would s t i l l be p o s s i b l e . See* .g.fl.r 
S ta te v . Gal legos , 193 Neb. 6 5 1 , 228 N.W.2d 615 (1975); Liqhtfoot 
v. S t a t e , 278 Md. 231 , 360 A.2d 426 (1976); Perkins and Boyce, 
Criminal Law 612 (3d ed. 1982) . Thus, i t does not matter whether 
the jury found a completed robbery or an attempted robbery. If 
the jury found a completed robbery, i t neces sar i l y found an 
attempt to commit that crime—the necessary element of aggravated 
robbery that the S ta te i s re ly ing upon in t h i s case . 
For the addi t ional and d i s t i n c t ac t of taking the 
jewelry , defendant could v a l i d l y be convicted of t h e f t , which 
requires that the actor "obtain!] or e x e r c i s e ! ] unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a purpose t o deprive 
him thereof ." Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978). Therefore, 
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after a c lose examination of the manner in which defendant was 
charged and the in s t ruc t ions t o the jury, i t i s c lear that the 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s denial of defendant's motion t o dismiss can be 
j u s t i f i e d on the "d i s t inc t act" a n a l y s i s s e t forth above. 
Accordingly, t h i s Court should affirm defendant's convict ions for 
both aggravated robbery and t h e f t . See O'Brien* J o l i v e t : and 
Porter . 
PQINT y 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS. 
When considering a chal lenge to the su f f i c i ency of the 
evidence, t h i s Court has applied the fol lowing standard of 
review: 
This Court w i l l not l i g h t l y overturn the 
f indings of a jury. We must view the e v i -
dence properly presented at tr iad in the 
l i g h t most favorable t o the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t f 
and w i l l only in ter f ere when the evidence 
i s so lacking and insubstant ia l that a 
reasonable man could not poss ib ly have 
reached a verdic t beyond a reasonable 
doubt. We a l so view in a l i g h t most 
favorable to the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t those 
f a c t s which can be reasonably inferred 
' from the evidence presented t o i t . 
State v . McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 , 945 (Utah 1982) ( c i t a t i o n s 
omitted) . As noted in S ta te v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985): 
In reviewing the convic t ion , we do not s u b s t i -
t u t e our judgment for that of the jury. "It 
i s the exc lus ive function of the jury to weigh 
the evidence and to determine the c r e d i b i l i t y 
of the wi tnesses . . . •" State v . Lamm, Utahr 
606 P.2d 229 f 231 (1980); accord S ta te v. 
Linden, Utahf 657 P.2d 1264, 1366 (1983) . So 
long as there i s some evidence, including 
reasonable in ferences , from which f indings of 
a l l the r e q u i s i t e elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, our inquiry s t o p s . 
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I d . at 345 ( c i t a t i on omi t ted) . And, even if the Court views the 
evidence as l e s s than wholly conclusive, or if contradictory 
evidence or conf l ic t ing inferences e x i s t , the verdic t should be 
upheld. S t a t e v. Howell. 649 P.2d 9 1 , 97 (Utah 1982). In shor t , 
"on conf l ic t ing evidence the Court i s obliged t o accept the 
version of the f ac t s which supports the v e r d i c t . " S ta t e v. 
Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555, 556 (Utah 1985) (c i t ing State v. Howell, 
649 P.2d a t 93)• 
Defendant's insuff iciency argument i s l i t t l e more than 
a request for t h i s Court to engage in de novo review of the 
weight of the evidence and the c r e d i b i l i t y of the witnesses , and 
then to s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment for t ha t of the j u ry . Four 
eyewitnesses, including one inside the jewelry s to re who was the 
victim of an aggravated assau l t by defendant, firmly placed 
defendant a t the scene of the crimes. In t h a t a v i c t i m ' s firm 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the perpetra tor of the crime alone i s 
suf f ic ien t t o susta in a j u r y ' s gu i l ty verd ic t , Sta te v. Malmrose, 
649 P.2d 56, 62 (Utah 1982), the v i c t i m ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of 
defendant, coupled with i den t i f i c a t i ons of defendant from the 
three other eyewitnesses, ce r ta in ly cons t i tu t e s su f f i c i en t 
evidence to support defendant 's convict ions . Moreover, the jury 
was not obl igated to believe defendant 's a l i b i evidence. S ta te 
v. Linden, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (Utah 1983). 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE. 
Defendant c la ims t h a t t h e t r i a l cour t should have 
g ran ted h i s motion t o d i smis s t h e h a b i t u a l c r imina l charge 
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because the S ta te f a i l e d t o present v a l i d evidence of the 
r e q u i s i t e number of prior felony convict ions to support a f inding 
against him on that charge. See Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 
(1978). S p e c i f i c a l l y , he argues tha t , because two of the three 
prior convic t ions ( i . e . f the 1973 contro l l ed substance convict ion 
(Exhibit 4-S) and the 1975 aggravated robbery convict ion (Exhibit 
2-S)) were based upon g u i l t y p leas not accompanied by an 
a f f idav i t of defendant ind icat ing that the plea was made 
knowingly and v o l u n t a r i l y , those two convic t ions could not 
v a l i d l y be used for purposes of the habitual criminal s t a t u t e . 
"The burden of showing error i s on the party who seeks 
to upset the judgment." S ta te v. J o n e s . 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 
(Utah 1982) . Thus, defendant carr i e s the burden of showing that 
h i s contro l led substance and robbery conv ic t ions , the 
documentation of which are not in d ispute , were products of 
involuntary g u i l t y p l e a s . Defendant presented no evidence t o the 
t r i a l court , and presents none to t h i s Court, t o support h i s 
contention that h i s g u i l t y p leas were involuntary? he po ints only 
t o the absence of the signed a f f i d a v i t referred to above which, 
by h i s own admission, i s d iscret ionary with the t r i a l court under 
l o c a l ru le . Under these circumstances, the Court should assume 
regular i ty in the proceedings below. S ta te v. Mil lert 718 P.2d 
403 , 405 (Utah 1986) . 
Furthermore, the S t a t e ' s evidence of defendant's prior 
convic t ions showed that defendant was represented by counsel when 
he entered the g u i l t y p l e a s . I t i s we l l e s tab l i shed in t h i s 
s t a t e that "when a defendant enters a plea of g u i l t y upon the 
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advice of a competent attorney, the plea is deemed to be 
intelligently entered." Guqlielmetti v. Turner. 27 Utah 2d 341, 
343f 496 P.2d 261, 262 (1972). See also Moxley v. Morris. 655 
P.2d 640 n.l (Utah 1982). Defendant makes no claim that his 
counsel in either case was inadequate. Thus, because defendant 
failed to rebut the presumption that his pleas were entered 
voluntarily, admission of the evidence of his prior convictions 
based on those pleas was proper and could be relied upon in 
determining that he was a habitual criminal. See State v. 
Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1985) ("The fact that defendant 
was represented by counsel and was advised by a copy of the 
information of the charge raises a presumption that his plea was 
entered with an understanding of the nature and elements of the 
charge."). Insofar as State v. Chervenell. 28 Wash. App. 805, 
626 P.2d 530 (1981), is inconsistent with this conclusion, it 
simply is not controlling authority. 
POINT VII 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REVERSALS OF HIS 
CONVICTIONS BASED ON A THEORY OF CUMULATIVE 
ERROR. 
D e f e n d a n t ' s cumula t ive error argument should be 
d i s p o s e d of i n the same way t h i s Court d iposed of a s i m i l a r 
argument i n S t a t e v . Rammel # 36 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 0 , 4 2 - 4 3 , 
P .2d _ _ , ( 1 9 8 6 ) . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon t h e f o r e g o i n g arguments , d e f e n d a n t ' s 
c o n v i c t i o n s should be a f f i r m e d . 
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